Political changes at the end of the eighties have triggered a major restructuring
and reform process in Central and Eastern Europe. The drive towards free
market mechanisms and democracy in the former socialist countries has been
supported by the EC Phare programmes since a very early stage. But what
seemed at first to be a short endeavour turned out to be a long, still ongoing
undertaking, which is only starting to slowly bear fruit.
The European Commission Phare is one of the donor agencies active in
the health sector (see inset); others include the World Bank, UNICEF, and
UNFDP. Also there are a significant number of so-called bilateral donors,
each with their own specific objectives. Particularly important for the
Health Sector is the WHO (World Health Organisation) with its "Health
for All" strategy, who acts as a reference point.
IESE has been active in the field of health management for many years.
Our involvement in Phare health projects started in 1992 in the former Czechoslovakia
where we worked with the King's Fund College, London. This initial project
involved Profs. Antoni García Prat, Jaume Ribera, Josep Valor and
myself. Since then, we have worked on many projects in practically all the
Phare countries.
European Commission rules require teams of experts with at least three
different European or "Phare" nationalities. A worthwhile bi-product
of this "bouillon de culture" is that each expert, already knowledgeable
in his or her national system, has to confront challenges and ideas arising
from the different environments and contexts in which he or she now works;
that of the aid recipient country and the different home countries. A small
contribution to the making of Europe!
This work in such an important and complex sector has provided us with
a grand circle view of the challenges these countries are facing in the
process of restructuring their economy.
SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The Socialist Health System
The Socialist Health System was introduced in the Soviet Union in the
20's as part of the "new" organisation of the state. The so-called
"socialized medicine" system based on prevention, access and equity,
together with the "ending of exploitation of men by men" would
lead, in the long run, to a decreased need for clinical and medical services.
Under Stalin, the system changed to a more clinical approach, health care
was supposed to serve the drive for production, maintaining the labour force's
health and controlling absenteeism. In the following 60 years, no major
changes were made and, in fact, this approach served as a blueprint for
all other communist states.
This "national health" type system is based on the right, guaranteed
by the constitution, to free medical care from qualified personnel provided
by state health institutions. With a bureaucratic central planning function,
it was run, financed and managed by the state. The structure was vertical,
strictly hierarchical and party-influenced with no freedom of choice for
the major part of the population; only the so-called "nomenclatura"
had unlimited and free access to higher quality service, a fact which led
to the development of secondary markets.
Decline and problems of the system
The decline of the system was predictable as initial investments were
not repeated. It was as if the system was supposed to run without maintenance.
Resources dedicated to the health sector decreased as a percentage of the
national budget, especially during the arms race in the eighties, and thereafter
as the general economy worsened.
Infant mortality, usually a good indicator of a health system's quality
and the standard of living in general, showed first positive and then, at
least, stable trends for decades in the USSR, but deteriorated sharply in
the early seventies. This aggravation, together with the decrease in life
expectancy encountered in all ex-communist states in the late seventies
and early eighties happened long before the collapse of the economic system.
Now that the systems are open to external analysis, their weaknesses
are more obvious. The system is undercapitalized and labour-intensive with
enormous overcapacity and low efficiency. Access, originally conceived as
being one of the strong points of the socialist system, proved to be a major
problem with the emergence of large, secondary markets.
High praise for the central planning system turned out to be hollow boast:
there had never been any real planning due to the lack of need-oriented
criteria and reliable data. Now, when strategic planning is so badly needed,
people find the idea anathema, perceiving it as part of the old discredited
control system.
Owning information is considered a source of power and this makes the
task of information analysis very difficult. Interested parties have been
exploiting the data-collecting system for decades and wish to continue to
be the only ones to do so.
The centrally organised budget system does not allow for many adjustments
to different local needs, thus leaving little room for manoeuvre on the
ground. The reported reality is made to fit what is budgetarily correct.
Most executives of the system are merely administrators with a very compartmentalized
view of the system. As a result, decisions are made in isolation on logically
linked issues such as, for example, investment, operating expenses and maintenance
costs.
Executive positions are held by physicians who often have no real management
training and who are more interested in clinical practice than the institution's
financial soundness. Appointments to all levels are mainly political with
the risk of resulting incompetence and instability. Following the appointment
of a new Minister, there has often been a complete change of ministerial
staff from the State Secretary to the janitor. For long periods, foreign
consultants have often been the most stable part of some ministries.
The old power structures with information flowing up and orders coming
down remained active in most parts of the system. Assuming responsibility
was demonstrably very dangerous in former times thus generating a high present
aversion to risk. Unless there is a clear legal basis, decisions are usually
pushed upwards until they reach the Minister, who must then examine all
these, often trivial, issues, leaving little time for strategic thinking.
There is a widespread demand for laws and regulations as they are seen to
simplify decision-making and relieve managers of the need for creativity
in finding solutions.
In most countries, physicians and other personnel are still on an underfinanced
state budget, earning salaries far below those of less qualified personnel
in the private sector. Consequently, the most valuable human resources are
leaving the system. This explains poor working morale and a perfunctory
attitude towards duty on the part of the remaining employees. Pharmaceuticals
have to be imported and they consume a major part of the health budget.
Medical and other equipment is very often antiquated and of poor quality.
Some represent a real danger for the patients. The situation is much worse
in the poorer countries in the south.
The environment has not been a concern in the socialist system where,
often, a smoking factory chimney was a symbol of progress. The regulations
are still behind Western European standards. Even if they exist, there are
no means to enforce them. This all affects the incidence of respiratory
and oncological diseases. Other health concerns are the high consumption
of alcohol and tobacco, abortion as a means of contraception and a high
suicide rate.
The Reform of the Health System
The official ministerial declarations on health reform contain goals
like improving the population's health, improving the system's efficiency,
cost containment, better use of resources, increased quality of services,
access and equity.
Although these output measures sound attractive, usually the reforms
are input-oriented. This is due, in part, to the strong hospital orientation
of the physician-led system. Also, Ministers tend to prefer photo opportunities
such as inaugurating a new linear accelerator rather than meeting with staff
to discuss the management of investment spending. Since resource allocation
is highly, if not wholly, politicised, it is considered preferable to apply
straightforward political criteria without any analysis. The more hard analysis
available, the harder it can be to make a "politically sound"
decision later.
This bias towards tangible inputs is also revealed in the development
of the national health information systems. Usually hardware is thought
to solve all problems and little effort is spent on the design and organisational
development of the overall system.
Health systems in Western European countries and their recent reforms
have been used as paradigms. Some elements appear so attractive that the
implications of their integration are not thoroughly thought through. Parts
of the German system (populated by private, independent and well-off physicians)
has been copied without proper adaptation.
Due partly to the leadership instability, the change process is often
poorly managed: the need for good communication is neglected. Wrong expectations,
fear and misunderstanding lead to resistances from stakeholders and the
general population. The result is that important structural problems - as
in the health sector: overcapacity, financing systems, hospital planning
- have not been addressed yet.
Sometimes the consultant is viewed as a source of ready-made solutions
without any need for ministerial involvement. Ministerial offices are often
understaffed and the project work adds to their normal duties. People above
a certain age may be no longer willing or able to change. The younger are
often much more enthusiastic, open to change and willing to learn, but they
may be too busy with day to day issues.
FIRST RESULTS
We have been working on projects dealing with health financing, investment
strategy, accounting, hospital cost control systems and health information
systems in Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Romania, Poland, the Baltic States,
Albania and most recently the new state of Bosnia Herzegovina. The latest
work has involved designing up the Phare programmes in some of the countries.
Despite the drawbacks and problems encountered, we were able to witness
some tangible successes: the introduction of modern cost control systems
in hospital management in Romania and the final parliamentary passing of
the health insurance law in Poland.
But probably much more has been achieved in the details: we have met
very enthusiastic people trying to perform miracles within the economic
and equipment limits they face. They are also eager to improve their management
skills, something that is difficult to do in their own country. Now, with
new tools and know- how, they master their job better, with increased responsibility,
and a move towards decentralisation and privatisation all contributing to
their sense of creativity. Here, the experience with pilot projects was
very rewarding: dealing with concrete issues progresses faster with better
results. This gave positive feedback to the reform-makers and pushed the
reform process forward.
Another good learning point was that not all that is "old"
is "bad", e.g. prevention in the centralised, compulsory system,
or the collaboration of physicians in polyclinics. It might be advisable
to maintain some of these characteristics in the new system.
Phare projects and other Technical Assistance (TA) projects have shown
their first results. While these achievements are easier in other sectors
(homogenisation of laws and standardisation, etc.), there is no 'European
way' in the Health Sector. And it was not always possible to avoid falling
into the same problems of the Western systems as it is difficult to learn
from experiences elsewhere. But the TA programmes provided know-how in the
approach to common problems and the management of change. This is a learning
process on all sides: donor, recipient and consultant. One positive output
is certainly the number of well trained locals, although not always in their
original field of work, and more experienced consultants with a better idea
of what the future Europe could be like.
The work in the Health sector in these countries has not finished. There
is still a lot to do even though the sector gets sometimes neglected, due
to other more obvious priorities. But to promote sound economic systems
with a view to future expansion of the European Union, health and social
aspects in these countries will be as vital for them as future member states
as they are for the existing members.
Conclusion
More links, and an increasing number of private business contacts will
be made with all these countries. Problems similar to those we have seen
in the health sector, inherited from the long period of communist rule,
will inevitably sooner or later be encountered in other sectors. In fact,
they are probably not much different from those found in Western countries,
only more widespread and deeply rooted in behavior. Some points of mutual
understanding have been created. Phare local units in the different sectors
are continuing to assist the reform and restructuring processes. They are
also a good source of information and a way of making contact with the recipient
country.
Bibliographic References
- "European Health Reforms, Analysis of Current Strategies, Summary",
WHO, Regional Office Europe, Copenhagen © 1996.
- "Gesundheitssysteme im Vergleich", Markus Schneider, BASYS,
Augsburg © 1994.
- "Market Mechanisms and the Health Sector in Central and Eastern
Europe", A. Preker et al., The World Bank, Washington © Dec. 1995.
- "Phare Progress and Strategy Phare Health", Helene Bourgade,
Phare Implementation Unit, European Commission, Brussels © July 1994.
- "Soziale Sicherung in West-Mittel-und Osteuropa", Axel Weber
et al., Nomos, Baden Baden © 1994.
- "The International Handbook of Health Care Systems", Richard
B. Saltman (ed.), Greenwood Press, Westport Conneticut © 1988.
- "What is Phare", European Commission DG1a, Brussels, ©
1995; and http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg1a/dg1ahome.htm.

Phare, originally "Poland Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring
of the Economy" was created in 1989 and then progressively extended
to other CEECs. These are now: Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
FYROM - Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. The newest member is Bosnia Herzegovina,
now grouped with the other Balkan states in the newly created "OBNOVA"
programme. Looking towards future European integration, association agreements
(the so called "Europe Agreement") have been signed with nine
of the countries (italized) with Phare acting as the "Pre Accession"
instrument of the European Commission.
A condition for any Phare funding is commitment to democracy and progress
towards a market economy.
- Objectives:
- Support the restructuring and reform process in the countries during
their move towards free market and democracy to assure long-term viability
and sustainability in line with macroeconomic developments and social acceptability.
- Assist the partners in implementing the "Acquis Communautaires":
institution-building, harmo-nization of laws towards convergence on the
economical, sociopolitical and cultural fronts.
- Bring industries and major infrastructure up to Community standards through
increasingly large investment funding.
- Areas of intervention:
- Restructuring of state enterprises and private sector development,
modernisation of banking and financial services.
- Agricultural restructuring and reform
- Public administration and institutional reform (e.g. customs)
- Reform of social services and employment
- Education and health
- Infrastructure (telecommunication, transport), environment, nuclear safety.
- Types of programmes:
- National Programmes in priority sectors
- Multi Country Programmes
- Cross Border Programmes
- Democracy Programmes
- Types of approaches:
- Know How Transfer / Technical Assistance: policy and strategy design,
institutional building, conferences, pilot implementation, training, study
tours.
- Investment, Infrastructure.
- Academic Development (TEMPUS), support of NGOs (LIEN), support to participate
in European Union Programmes.
- Budget:
- At the end of the first six years: 5.4 Billion Ecus.
More Information on the Internet:
- http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg1a/dg1ahome.htm
- http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg1a/phare/phare.htm |